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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Lynn Johnson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver, 
possessing marijuana, and possessing drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he 
challenges the denial of his motion for a mistrial and also argues the district court 
imposed an excessive sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On April 27, 2011, police officers executed a search warrant on a 
residence at 4219 W. Bethel Street in Boise. (Tr., 1 p.145, Ls.11-16, p.177, 
Ls.15-24, p.284, Ls.4-18, p.299, Ls.5-11, p.381, Ls.4-11.) Amber Leonard and 
Jacob Lee were the only individuals present in the home when the officers 
searched it. (Tr., p.375, Ls.16-21, p.382, L.24 - p.383, L.8.) Although Johnson 
was not present during the search, officers believed he resided in the home with 
Leonard. (Tr., p.388, Ls.11-20, p.394, Ls.19-24.) 
While searching a bedroom of the house, officers found a letter and an 
identification card with Johnson's name on them, several methamphetamine 
pipes, a box of Ziploc baggies, a propane torch, and "a lot" of a white powdery 
substance. (Tr., p.154, L.7 - p.161, L.10; State's Exhibits 2-5.) In a second 
bedroom, officers found marijuana, a methamphetamine pipe, cash and a drug 
1 The appellate record contains two separately bound volumes of transcripts. 
The volume containing the transcript of the jury trial held March 26-28, 2012, is 
cited herein as "Tr." The volume containing the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing held May 16, 2012, is cited herein as "Sent. Tr." 
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ledger. (Tr., p.238, L.10 - p.242, L.8; State's Exhibits 18-26.) In the garage, 
they found a safe that contained methamphetamine, marijuana, measuring 
devices, packaging materials, pipes and over $300 in cash. (Tr., p.164, Ls.5-7, 
p.183, L.19 - p.190, L.3, p.192, L.13 - p.195, L.9, p.196, L.8 - p.199, L.10; 
State's Exhibits 6-8, 10-17.) Also in the safe were Johnson's social security 
card, birth certificate, vehicle title and credit card. (Tr., p.190, L.4 - p.191, L.10, 
p.390, L.19 - p.392, L.19; State's Exhibits 9, 34-36.) 
Officers ultimately arrested Johnson at his workplace and, in a post-
Miranda2 interview, Johnson admitted the safe in the garage was his.3 (Tr., 
p.394, L.19 - p.395, L.22.) After being advised of her Miranda rights, Leonard 
initially indicated she did not want to talk to officers. (Tr., p.384, L.21 - p.385, 
L.2, p.394, Ls.11-18, p.515, Ls.17-22; see also PSI, p.15.) She subsequently 
waived her Miranda rights, however, and made several admissions, including 
that she used and dealt marijuana, that she smoked methamphetamine earlier in 
the day, and that the items in the second bedroom, including the 
methamphetamine pipe, belonged to her. (Tr., p.309, L.3 - p.321, L.12, p.355, 
L.9 - p.357, L.7.) 
The state charged Johnson with possession of methamphetamine with 
intent to deliver, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 Although not presented as evidence at trial, the record indicates that, after 
admitting the safe was his, Johnson invoked his right to counsel. (PSI, p.18.) 
The prosecutor apparently inadvertently made reference to this fact in his 
opening statement at Johnson's first trial and, as a result, a mistrial was 
declared. (R., pp.60-62.) 
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(R., pp.35-36.) The state also charged Leonard, in a separate case, with several 
drug related crimes. (See Tr., p.10, L.10 - p.11, L.11.) The cases were 
consolidated for trial. (R., pp.11-13.) 
In the joint trial that followed, Johnson did not testify. (Tr., p.446, Ls.10-
15.) Leonard testified, but her testimony was inconsistent with many of the 
admissions she had made in her post-Miranda interview. (See generally, Tr., 
p.448-78.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor introduced an audio recording of Leonard's 
police interview, in which there was a brief reference to the fact that Leonard had 
initially indicated a desire to not answer any questions. (Tr., p.511, L.24 - p.516, 
L.1; State's Exhibit 37.) Leonard moved for a mistrial and Johnson joined the 
motion, arguing there was a possibility the jury would impute Leonard's silence to 
him and infer his guilt therefrom. (Tr., p.516, L.2 - p.549, L.20.) The district 
court denied the motion (Tr., p.529, Ls.4-20, p.534, L.13 - p.535, L.7, p.548, L.4 
- p.549, L.21 ), finding specifically with respect to Johnson that "there [had] 
actually been no comment by anybody about him remaining silent" (Tr., p.543, 
Ls.11-14), and also finding that "any chance of prejudice [was] so slight" that a 
mistrial was not warranted (Tr., p.549, Ls.15-20). The court ordered the parties 
to refrain from making any comment about the offending portion of the recording 
in front of the jury (Tr., p.534, L.23 - p.535, L.7), allowed the state to introduce a 
redacted recording (State's Exhibit 378) (Tr., p.634, L.5 - p.638, L.14, p.639, L.1 
- p.651, L.12), and did not allow the original recording (State's Exhibit 37) to be 
submitted to the jury during their deliberations (Tr., p.551, L.24 - p.552, L.18; R., 
p.150). 
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At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty as charged. 
(R., p.124; Tr., p.714, Ls.3-12.) The district court entered judgment on the jury's 
verdict and imposed an aggregate unified sentence of 15 years, with three years 
fixed. (R., pp.127-30.) Johnson timely appeals. (R., pp.134-37.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied 
Mr. Johnson's motion for a mistrial? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, 
upon Mr. Johnson following his conviction for felony 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
deliver? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Johnson failed to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of his 
motion for a mistrial? 
2. Has Johnson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
in imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed, upon 




Johnson Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Motion For A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
When she was arrested, Johnson's co-defendant, Amber Leonard, made 
a number of admissions regarding her connection to the Bethel Street residence 
that was the subject of the search warrant, the items of contraband that were 
found there, and her own illegal drug activity. (Tr., p.355, L.9 - p.357, L.7, 
p.309, L.3 - p.321, L.12, p.639, L.3 - p.651, L.12; State's Exhibit 37B.) In her 
case-in-chief, Leonard testified inconsistently with those admissions. (See 
generally, Tr., pp.448-78.) In rebuttal, the state offered into evidence an audio 
recording of Leonard's police interview (State's Exhibit 37). (Tr., p.511, L.11 -
p.512, L.25.) The recorded interview, which had been provided to both defense 
counsel the night before (Tr., p.518, Ls.14-16, p.555, L.11 - p.556, L.3), was 
admitted without objection and published to the jury (Tr., p.512, L.24 - p.514, 
L.14). 
Near the beginning of the recording, the following exchange took place 
between the interviewing officer and Leonard: 
OFFICER: Here is the thing: The charges that you are looking at 
only - I mean, there's a meth pipe back in your room. There is 
some weed out in the garage and paraphernalia everywhere. You 
talked to Officer Reimers. Okay. I would rather not charge you 
with a bunch of stuff that isn't really - that's yours. And I know you 
said to him that you didn't want to answer questions. I think you're 
straight-up enough -
AMBER LEONARD: Right. 
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OFFICER[:] I would like to ask you what's yours and what's not 
yours. 
(Tr., p.515, L. 13 - p.516, L.1.) 
Immediately following this exchange, Leonard's counsel asked to pause 
the recording and, outside the presence of the jury, requested a mistrial. (Tr., 
p.516, L.2 - p.517, L.6.) As the basis for his motion, Leonard's counsel argued 
the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct by not redacting from the recording 
the reference to Leonard's assertion of her right to remain silent. (R., p.516, 
L.12- p.517, L.6, p.521, L.10- p.522, L.16, p.526, L.22- p.527, L.2.) After the 
district court indicated it was "inclined to deny the motion" (Tr., p.529, Ls.4-20), 
counsel for Johnson joined the motion for mistrial, arguing: 
With the issue in this particular case, I do believe there also arises 
an undue prejudice towards my client. Ms. Leonard has testified as 
to facts that relate directly to Mr. Johnson. 
And my concern is now, as I reviewed the cases once again 
just over the break, that somehow is her silence now going to be 
imputed to my client? The issue that we have here is I have got -
my client has asserted his right to remain silent. 
(Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.532, L.9; see also Tr., p.542, L.6 - p.543, L.6 ("So my client 
is now left with exercising his right to remain silent because we have rested. 
There is testimony in the record that infers guilt from exercising your right to 
remain silent. So we are in a position where I do believe that it is prejudicial.").) 
The district court ultimately denied the motion for a mistrial, concluding with 
respect to Johnson that there had not actually been any comment on his right to 
remain silent. (Tr., p.543, Ls.7-14.) The court also noted it was "not convinced" 
the jury would "even pay any attention to" the comment on Leonard's silence 
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given "the way it came up in this case" (Tr., p.548, Ls.19-22) and found "any 
chance of prejudice is so slight" that a mistrial was not warranted (Tr., p.549, 
Ls.15-20). 
Johnson now challenges the denial of his motion for a mistrial, arguing as 
he did below that "the prosecutor committed misconduct by using [the 
interviewing officer's] statement regarding Ms. Leonard's invocation of the right 
to remain silent to indirectly comment on Mr. Johnson's own silence and thereby 
have the jury infer his guilt." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) To the extent Johnson's 
prosecutorial misconduct argument rests on a vicarious assertion of Leonard's 
Fifth Amendment privilege, it fails; there was no comment on Johnson's post-
Miranda silence, and Johnson lacks standing to complain of a violation Leonard's 
constitutional rights. Even assuming Johnson could vicariously rely on a 
violation of Leonard's constitutional privilege to establish a violation of his own 
constitutional rights, he has failed to show any basis for reversal; viewed in 
context of the full record, the brief reference to Leonard's invocation of the right 
to remain silent was not so prejudicial as to deprive Johnson of a fair trial. 
Johnson has failed to establish error in the denial of his motion for a mistrial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review for the denial of a motion for mistrial is 
well-established. "[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial court 
reasonably exercised its discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made." State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _, 297 
P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). Rather, the reviewing court "examine[s] whether 
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the event that precipitated the motion constituted reversible error when viewed in 
the context of the full record." kl (citing State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 
912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003); State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 765-66, 27 4 
P.3d 1279, 1280-81 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 192, 254 
P.3d 77, 93 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 
894 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Urguhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 
(Ct. App. 1983)). The focus of appellate review "is upon the ultimate impact on 
the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion," and "[t]he trial court's 
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that event, viewed 
retrospectively, amounted to reversible error." Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at_, 
297 P.3d at 263 (citing Urguhart, 105 Idaho at 95, 665 P.2d at 1105). 
C. Johnson Cannot Demonstrate That The Comment On Leonard's Post-
Miranda Silence Improperly Infringed On His Own Fifth Amendment And 
Due Process Rights 
A mistrial is appropriate where there "occurs during the trial an error or 
legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, 
which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." 
I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Johnson's motion for mistrial rested on his claim that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing evidence of Leonard's post-
Miranda silence for the purpose of inferring her guilt, and that "somehow" the jury 
might impute Leonard's silence to Johnson and infer his guilt therefrom. (Tr., 
pp.531, L.22 - p.533, L.3, p.542, L.6 - p.543, L.6.) Although phrased somewhat 
differently, Johnson advances essentially the same argument on appeal, 
contending "the prosecutor committed misconduct by using [evidence of] Ms. 
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Leonard's invocation of the right to remain silent to indirectly comment on Mr. 
Johnson's own silence and thereby have the jury infer his guilt." (Appellant's 
brief, p.14.) Regardless of the phrasing, Johnson's complaint ultimately boils 
down to a claim that presentation of evidence that Leonard invoked her Miranda 
rights somehow improperly infringed on Johnson's own Fifth Amendment and 
due process rights. This claim is without merit. As found by the district court, 
there was no actual comment on Johnson's post-Miranda silence (Tr., p.543, 
Ls.11-14), and the evidence of Leonard's post-Miranda silence did not, as a 
matter of law, violate Johnson's constitutional rights. 
"The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well 
as Article 1, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant 
the right not to be compelled to testify against himself." State v. Ellington, 151 
Idaho 53, 60, 253 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (citing U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; 
Idaho Cost. art. I, § 13). In recognition of this privilege, and of the implied 
promise attendant to Miranda warnings that "silence will carry no penalty," the 
United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), 
that the "use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of 
arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Accord, ~. State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 300 
P.3d 1046, 1056 (2013) (comment in closing argument on defendant's post-
Miranda silence violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights); Ellington, 151 
Idaho at 60, 253 P.3d at 734 ("[A] prosecutor may not use evidence of post-
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arrest, post-Miranda silence for either impeachment, or as substantive evidence 
of guilt in the State's case-in-chief." (internal citations omitted)). 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is, however, 
purely a personal right and may not be vicariously asserted. Bellis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 627 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("a defendant may not object to the violation of another person's 
privilege); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 984 (5th Cir. 1977) (same), 
vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. Cardenas 
Alvarado, 806 F.2d 566, 574 (1986); People v. Homes, 654 N.E.2d 662, 668 (Ill. 
App. 1995). For this reason, "a defendant cannot complain of any Doyle-type 
unfairness that might be seen in impeachment of a defense witness." Rubin, 
559 F.2d at 984; see also Homes, 654 N.E.2d at 668 (defendant lacked standing 
to complain the use of a defense witness' post-arrest silence for impeachment of 
defense witness violated defendant's own Fifth Amendment rights). Nor can a 
defendant complain that the improper use of a co-defendant's post-Miranda 
silence violated his own Fifth Amendment rights. See Cardenas Alvarado, 806 
F.2d at 574 (declining to consider defendant's claims that comments at trial on 
co-defendants' silence improperly commented on defendant's silence because 
defendant "could only complain about violations of his own rights"). Yet 
vicariously asserting Leonard's rights is exactly what Johnson is improperly 
attempting to do in this case. 
It is uncontested that the prosecutor did not introduce into evidence any 
actual reference to Johnson's own post-Miranda silence. While the reference in 
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the state's rebuttal case to Leonard's statement she, at one time, did not want to 
answer any questions could conceivably have violated Leonard's rights against 
self incrimination, it did not, as a matter of law, violate Johnson's own rights.4 
Johnson has therefore failed to establish that the district court erred in denying 
his motion for a mistrial because the complained of conduct was not a comment 
on Johnson's silence. 
D. Viewed Retrospectively, And In Context Of The Entire Record, The Brief 
Reference To Leonard's Initial Statement That She Did Not Want To 
Answer Questions Did Not Render Johnson's Trial Unfair 
A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for 
mistrial unless, viewed retrospectively, and in the context of the full trial, the 
event that precipitated the motion for mistrial constituted reversible error. State 
v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003); State v. 
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _, 297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013); see also 
I.C.R. 29.1 (a) (mistrial appropriate only when there occurs an error that "is 
prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial."). "An error 
is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court is able to declare 
4 In making this argument, the state in no way intends to imply that evidence 
regarding Leonard's statement that she did not want to answer questions was 
admissible against Johnson. See Homes, 654 N.E.2d at 668 (citing United 
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975)) ("Generally, an accused's silence 
during police interrogation cannot be used for impeachment purposes because it 
is so ambiguous that it lacks the requisite inconsistency with his later exculpatory 
testimony at trial."). The state merely asserts that the reference to Leonard's 
post-Miranda invocation of her right to remain silent did not violate Johnson's 
own constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Because the claimed 
constitutional violation was the only basis on which Johnson moved for a mistrial, 
he has failed to show error in the denial of his motion. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." 
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at_, 297 P.3d at 263 (citing Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 
(2010) ). For the reasons set forth above, Johnson cannot vicariously rely on any 
alleged violation of Leonard's constitution privilege against self-incrimination to 
establish a violation of his own constitutional rights. Even if he could, he would 
still not be entitled to reversal because, viewed retrospectively and in the context 
of the full record, there is no reasonable possibility that the brief reference to 
Leonard's invocation of the right to remain silent contributed to the jury's verdict 
or otherwise deprived Johnson of a fair trial. 
The only prejudice Johnson has ever claimed to have suffered as a result 
of the introduction of evidence that Leonard initially stated she did not want to 
answer questions was the risk that "somehow" the jury would impute Leonard's 
silence to Johnson and infer his guilt therefrom. (Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.533, L.3, 
p.542, L.6 - p.543, L.6; Appellant's brief, pp.13-17.) Contrary to Johnson's 
assertions, however, the risk that the jury would do so was, at worst, negligible 
and, at best, nonexistent. 
As already discussed above, the constitutional protections afforded by the 
Fifth Amendment insulate defendants from the adverse effects of their own 
invocation of silence in the face of custodial interrogation. As a matter of law, 
those protections do not extend to defendants claiming a violation of someone 
else's right to silence. See Section C, supra (and cases cited therein). Implicit in 
this distinction is a recognition that a defendant cannot be prejudiced in any 
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constitutional sense by a reference at trial to a third party's invocation of the right 
to remain silent. In fact, at least one Supreme Court Justice has opined that the 
use at trial of "a witness' prior silence does not raise any inference prejudicial to 
the defendant, and, indeed, does not even raise any inference that the 
defendant remained silent." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 627 n.5 (1976) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Aside from not being prejudicial to Johnson as a matter of law, there are 
also several reasons the reference to Leonard's initial invocation of her right to 
remain silent was also not reversible error under the facts of this case. First, the 
reference was fleeting and made very near the beginning of Leonard's recorded 
police interview, at a point where Leonard had already made statements to the 
officer that indicated she used illegal drugs. (See Tr., p.514, L.15 - p.515, L.22; 
State's Exhibit 37.) The reference was also somewhat ambiguous, consisting 
solely of the officer's statements to Leonard: "You talked to Officer Reimers. 
Okay. I would rather not charge you with a bunch of stuff that isn't really - that's 
yours. And I know you said to him that you didn't want to answer questions." 
(Tr., p.515, Ls.17-22.) In addition, the recording was presented after Leonard 
had taken the stand and testified. (See generally, Tr., pp.448-78.) While the 
comments in the recording may have communicated to the attorneys, trained in 
the law, that Leonard initially invoked her Miranda rights, it is far from clear on 
this record that the jury would have attributed the same meaning to the 
comments, much less that it would have inferred either defendant's guilt from 
Leonard's initial desire to not answer any questions. Indeed, given "the way [the 
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reference to Leonard's initial assertion of silence] came up in this case," even the 
district court was "not convinced that the jury" would "pay any attention to it." 
(Tr., p.548, Ls.20-22.) 
Second, it is clear from the record that the prosecutor neither intended to 
use nor actually used the reference to Leonard's initial invocation of silence as 
substantive evidence of either Leonard's or Johnson's guilt. By the time the 
reference was made, the jury had already heard testimony that Johnson and 
Leonard had both made admissions tending to establish their guilt of the charged 
crimes. (See Tr., p.309, L.3 - p.321, L.12, p.355, L.9 - p.357, L.7, p.395, Ls.7-
22.) The prosecutor introduced the recording in which the reference was made 
for the purpose of impeaching Leonard's self-exculpatory trial testimony with 
statements Leonard actually made after waiving her Miranda rights. While the 
inclusion in the original recording of the fact that Leonard initially indicated a 
desire to not answer any questions was improper, the prosecutor did not seek to 
exploit that reference, nor was he permitted to do so. The district court 
specifically admonished the parties to refrain from commenting on the reference 
to Leonard's initial invocation (Tr., p.534, L.23 - p.535, L.7) - which the court 
found was included in the original recording due to an oversight by the 
prosecutor (Tr., p.529, Ls8-11) - and also took steps to ensure the original 
recording was not submitted to the jury during its deliberations (Tr., p.551, L.24 -
p.552, L.18; R., p.150). In the end, a redacted recording containing only those 
statements that were actually inconsistent with Leonard's trial testimony was 
admitted for the jury's consideration. (See Tr., p.639, L.3 - p.651, L.1 O; State's 
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Exhibit 37B.) In light of this fact, and in light of the fact that the jury was never 
exposed to any evidence that Johnson exercised his right to silence in the face 
of custodial interrogation, there can be little doubt that the jury did not impute 
Leonard's silence to Johnson for the purpose of inferring his guilt. 
Third, even assuming, as suggested by Johnson's counsel below (see Tr., 
p.532, Ls.4-9, p.543, Ls.1-6), that the jury could potentially have drawn some 
negative inference from Leonard's initial post-Miranda silence and imputed that 
inference to Johnson because he exercised his right not to testify, any potential 
prejudice was ameliorated by the court's jury instructions. The court specifically 
instructed the jury that "[a] defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right 
not to be compelled to testify" and that it "must not draw any inference of guilt 
from the fact that the defendant does not testify." (R., p.115.) Presuming, as 
this Court must, that the jury followed this instruction, see State v. Grantham, 
146 Idaho 490, 198 P.3d 128 (Ct. App. 2008), there is no reasonable possibility 
that the reference to Leonard's post-Miranda silence contributed to Johnson's 
verdict. 
Finally, although Johnson claims otherwise, the evidence of his guilt was 
overwhelming. During the execution of a search warrant at Johnson's residence, 
officers found a safe containing methamphetamine, marijuana, measuring 
devices, packaging materials, pipes and over $300 in cash. (Tr., p.164, Ls.5-7, 
p.183, L.19 - p.190, L.3, p.192, L.13 - p.195, L.9, p.196, L.8 - p.199, L.10; 
State's Exhibits 6-8, 10-17.) The safe also contained a number of Johnson's 
personal effects, including his social security card, birth certificate, vehicle title 
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and credit card. (Tr., p.190, L.4 - p.191, L.10, p.390, L.19- p.392, L.19; State's 
Exhibits 9, 34-36.) In a post-Miranda interview, Johnson admitted the safe was 
his. (Tr., p.395, Ls.7-22.) While there was no fingerprint evidence specifically 
connecting Johnson to the contraband inside the safe, there "was nobody else's 
[identifying information] in there but his." (Tr., p.360, Ls.2-20.) Moreover, there 
was no credible evidence that anyone but Johnson had access to the safe or the 
contraband in it. 5 Given the strength of the evidence against Johnson, there is 
no reasonable possibility that the brief reference to his co-defendant's initial 
statement that she did not want to answer questions contributed to the jury's 
verdict. 
Review of the record shows the reference to Leonard's initial statement 
expressing a desire to not answer questions was both fleeting and ambiguous. 
The trial court took steps, short of declaring a mistrial, to ensure that neither 
defendant was prejudiced, including by instructing the jury to draw no adverse 
inference from the fact that Johnson did not testify. There was no further 
evidence of this matter presented. Under these circumstances, and given the 
strength of the evidence supporting his convictions, Johnson has failed to show 
error in the denial of his motion for a mistrial. 
5 Although Leonard testified in her case-in-chief that Jacob Lee had access to 
the safe and placed the bag containing the contraband in the safe on the same 
day officers searched it (see Tr., p.457, L.16 - p.458, L.1, p.461, L.17 - p.462, 
L.5), the bulk of her testimony was thoroughly discredited both on cross-
examination (see Tr., p.478, Ls.12-18) and in the state's rebuttal case through 
the admission of the audio recording of her police interview (see Tr., p.639, L.3 -
p.651, L.1 O; State's Exhibit 37B). 
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11. 
Johnson Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Johnson argues the unified sentence of 15 years, with three years fixed, 
imposed upon his conviction for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to 
deliver, is excessive and unnecessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-22.) The record, however, supports the sentence 
imposed; Johnson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. Id. 
C. Johnson Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl 
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The district court considered the objectives of sentencing and concluded, 
based on Johnson's character and the nature of the crime, that society needed 
to be protected and Johnson needed to be punished. (Sent. Tr., p.15, L.6 -
p.18, L.20.) Significant to the sentencing court were Johnson's criminal record 
(Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.4-20, p.18, Ls.21-23), his failure to overcome his own 
addiction or be deterred despite prior legal sanctions and opportunities to 
rehabilitate (Sent. Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.17, L.10, p.19, Ls.10-12), and the fact that 
Johnson was "creating havoc" and "real harm to others" by distributing "the 
number one or number two most addictive substance out there" -
methamphetamine (Sent. Tr., p.17, L.11 - p.18, L.20). The record supports the 
court's reasoning. 
Johnson has a long history of substance abuse and drug-related crimes. 
He pied guilty to his first felony (possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
deliver) in 1991 and received a withheld judgment. (PSI, pp.34-35.) In 1993, he 
was "placed on [a] specialized substance abuse caseload due to his continued 
drug usage and failure to comply with his probation requirements." (PSI, p.101.) 
After being placed in the substance abuse caseload, Johnson continued to 
exhibit "extremely poor" progress on probation. (PSI, pp.101-02.) In 1994, his 
withheld judgment was revoked and he was sentenced to a period of retained 
jurisdiction, after which he was again placed on probation. (PSI, pp.81, 83-84.) 
He very quickly violated that probation by, among other things, using marijuana 
and methamphetamine on a regular basis. (PSI, pp.80-81, 89-92.) He was also 
convicted of his second felony (possession of methamphetamine) in 1996. (PSI, 
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pp.3, 81, 84.) He served concurrent prison terms in both cases, was granted 
and then violated one term of parole, was granted a second parole and was 
finally discharged from parole in 2002. (PSI, p.3.) In 2011, Johnson was again 
using and distributing methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.4-5; R., p.124.) 
Johnson cites his "frequent headaches," drug addiction, and family 
support as factors he claims the district court did not find adequately mitigating. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-15.) Even considering these factors, however, Johnson 
has shown no abuse of discretion. 
This case represents Johnson's third conviction for a felony drug offense, 
and his second conviction for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to 
deliver. He has previously violated probation or parole on at least three 
occasions and, as found by the district court, has "squandered" multiple prior 
opportunities to overcome his addiction and "move on with [his] life." (Sent. Tr., 
p.19, Ls.10-12.) The crime at issue carries a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment. See I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The relatively short three-year fixed 
sentence imposed by the district court will give Johnson a meaningful opportunity 
for parole, while the lengthier 12-year indeterminate sentence will allow ample 
opportunity for rehabilitation if he secures release though sufficiently good 
behavior. Johnson has failed to show the sentence is excessive under any 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence. 
DATED this 10th day of September 2013. 
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